Media Uproar Versus Judicial Reasoning
- What the Delhi High Court Actually Ordered on 23 December 2025
- Time Already Spent in Custody by Kuldeep Singh Sengar
- The Question of ‘Public Servant’ Under the POCSO Act
- Supreme Court Precedent and the Antulay Judgment
A factual analysis of the Delhi High Court’s interim order suspending Kuldeep Singh Sengar’s sentence, examining law, precedent, and media outrage.
The Delhi High Court order in the Sengar case
The Delhi High Court by its interim order dated 23.12.2025 has suspended the life sentence awarded to ex-MLA Kuldeep Singh Sengar.
A big hue and cry has been raised in the Indian media fiercely attacking the verdict. Most of our media is of course largely concerned with TRP rating and circulation, to increase profits, and not with the truth. For that it has to serve 'mirch masala', i.e. sensationalism, to the public.
But it was surprising to note even senior lawyers of the Supreme Court, retired judges, retired DGPs, politicians, and so-called 'activists' also indulging in loud rhetoric and delivering emotional jeremiads, as if heavens had fallen, and the order has sounded the death knell of justice in India.
Allegations are even being made that the judges who passed the order may have been bribed.
I have grave doubts whether the people criticising the order have read it in full.
I have carefully perused the order of the bench of Justices Subramoniam Prasad and Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, and found it correct. In a well-considered 48-paragraph verdict, the bench has considered all relevant facts, legal provisions, and case law.
These are the points which must be noted :
1. Sengar has already spent 7 1/2 years in jail ( in fact, over 8 years in custody ). So it is not that he has not spent any time in jail
2. It is an interim order, not a final disposal of the appeal, which is still pending in the High Court. The bench has not gone into the merits of the case, e.g. whether the offence had in fact been committed by the appellant, whether the victim was a child (i.e. below 18) or not, etc, though the bench has noted the evidence indicating she was above 18.
3. The trial court had held that an MLA is a public servant, and this makes the offence an aggravated penetrative sexual assault under section 5(c) of the POCSO Act (The Prevention of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012), and hence deserving a sentence of not less than 20 years imprisonment or upto a life sentence under section 6.
However, the bench has rightly pointed out that in the POCSO Act the expression 'public servant' has not been defined, but section 2(2) states :
''(2) The words and expressions used herein and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), 2 [the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016)] and the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000) shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the said Codes or the Acts ''.
In none of the abovementioned Acts, except the Indian Penal Code, has the expression 'public servant' been defined. However it has been defined in section 21 of the Indian Penal Code, and that definition does not include an MLA.
The Supreme Court in Antulay's case has held that an MLA is not a public servant as defined in the Indian Penal Code, as is evident from a bare perusal of section 21..
The error of the trial court, as rightly noticed by the bench, was that it applied the definition of public servant in the Prevention of Corruption Act to the POSCO Act, though the Prevention of Corruption Act is not mentioned in section 2(2) of the POSCO Act.
4. As regards protection of the victim if the appellant is released, the bench has in para 44 directed the DCP of the area where the victim is residing to provide her full security. In para 45it has further directed:
''Considering all these issues and circumstances, this Court is inclined to suspend the sentence of the Appellant during the pendency of the Appeal, on the following conditions:
a. The Appellant shall furnish a security in the sum of Rs.15,00,000/- with three sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the concerned Jail Superintendant. The sureties must be residents of Delhi.
b. The Appellant is directed not to come within a 5 km radius of the place of residence of the Victim/Survivor.
c. The Appellant is directed to stay in Delhi during the pendency of the Appeal to ensure that the Appellant is available for completing the remaining part of the sentence in case he is found to be guilty.
d. The Appellant is directed not to threaten the Victim/Survivor or the mother of the Victim/Survivor.
e. The Appellant is directed to deposit his passport with the Trial Court.
f. The Appellant is directed to report in person to the Local Police Station once a week, i.e. on every Monday between 10 and 11 a.m. ''
I cannot find any flaw in this order. Should judicial verdicts be given on the basis of the law, or on the basis of emotions (perhaps even without reading the full order) ?
I am not saying that some judges do not do wrong things. But as far as this particular order is concerned, in my opinion, it is absolutely correct.
(Justice Markandey Katju is a former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, and former Chairman, of the Press Council of India. The views expressed are his own.)
